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One of the largest mobilizations in recent American history was the 
Women’s March of 2017, with millions of participants in cities across the 
United States and in concurrent events throughout the world. Despite 
diverse backgrounds and agendas, the marchers unified around the general 
theme of equality for women. 
It was a constitutional moment; the unity principles called for a new 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution.1 The ERA is a 
proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that reads, “Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of sex.”2 It was drafted and proposed in 1923, 
adopted by Congress almost 50 years later in 1972, and ratified by 35 
states before the 1979 deadline for ratification. The deadline was extended 
to 1982 but no additional states took advantage of this extension.3 Once 
the deadline lapsed, the proposed amendment was three states short of the 
requisite three-fourths of the states required by Article V to amend the 
Constitution.4 
In March of 2017, on the heels of the Women’s March, the United 
States took a remarkable step towards constitutional change: Nevada 
became the first state to ratify the ERA⸻35 years after the 1982 deadline 
* Professor, Cardozo School of Law.
1. J. Bob Alotta et al. Women’s March on Washington, Guiding Vision and Definition of
Principles, 4 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.womensmarch.com/principles. 
2. S.J. Res. 6, 115th Cong. (2017).
3. See MARJORIE SPRUILL, DIVIDED WE STAND: THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND 
FAMILY VALUES THAT POLARIZED AMERICAN POLITICS 280 (2017). 
4. For accounts of the ERA’s adoption and failure to be ratified by the requisite number of
states, see MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE 
AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); JOAN HOFF-WILSON, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE 
PAST AND FUTURE OF THE ERA (1986); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); 
GILBERT Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1985). 
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had lapsed.5 If Nevada’s ratification is legally valid, then the count is now 
36 ratified states. Ratification by merely two additional states would be 
sufficient to add a sex equality guarantee to the U.S. Constitution. 
Nevada’s ratification raises legal questions about the validity of a post-
deadline ratification of a Congressionally-adopted constitutional 
amendment.6 If Nevada’s ratification is a legitimate step towards 
achieving a valid constitutional amendment under Article V, and if this 
late ratification can be validated by a simple Congressional act removing 
the 1982 deadline,7 two additional states’ ratifications will put the ERA in 
the U.S. Constitution.8 During 2017, the state legislatures of several 
unratified states, including North Carolina, Illinois, Virginia, and Florida, 
introduced or re-introduced bills to ratify the ERA. There is newfound 
political momentum around ERA ratification9 that makes it imaginable 
that the ERA will become part of the U.S. Constitution very soon. 
This prospect raises deeper questions that I would like to explore in 
honor of Constitution Day. There are contested normative questions raised 
by this path towards constitutional change. If the ERA can be ratified with 
legal validity in 2017, the U.S. Constitution would adopt an amendment 
that was ratified by most of the states forty years ago, and initially drafted 
almost a century ago. Would we the people want such an amendment? 
Would it mean something different from what the framers and adopters 
intended? Should it mean something different from what its most vocal 
proponents are hoping to achieve? What, if anything, would the 
amendment change in the law, the lived experience of women and men, 
and gender relations in America of the twenty-first century? Would the 
ERA change what the law does to gender relations and gender equality—
or would a constitutional guarantee of sex equality be merely symbolic 
today? 
These questions matter because the status of women in American 
5. S.J. Res. 16, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). 
6. The Nevada legislature cited Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) to support the validity 
of post-deadline ratification, urging that Congress could remove the ERA ratification deadline by 
legislation. Nev. S.J. Res. 16. 
7. There are House and Senate bills that remove the deadline for the ERA’s ratification. See 
H.R.J. Res 53, 115th Cong. (2017) and S.J. Res. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). 
8. See Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon, & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & THE LAW 113 (1997). 
9. There have been ERA rallies, shout-outs by celebrities like Meryl Streep and Patricia
Arquette in favor of the ERA, and a group called the ERA Coalition devoted to passage of the ERA. 
For an account of the current ERA revival, see Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the 
Twenty-First Century: Bringing Global Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 381, 
386-88 (2017). 
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society has changed radically for the better since the ERA was first drafted 
and introduced in Congress in 1923. Almost 100 years ago, the ERA was 
drafted and introduced on the heels of the women’s suffrage amendment. 
The Nineteenth Amendment was added to the U.S. Constitution in 1920, 
however, women’s rights activists believed that the Nineteenth 
Amendment right to vote regardless of sex was not sufficient to truly 
establish women as full citizens with equal rights. Women were still 
excluded from many professions, and had few opportunities to flourish 
outside of their roles as wives and mothers in the private domestic sphere. 
Alice Paul, perhaps the most well-known American suffragist, introduced 
the Equal Rights Amendment in 1923, which declared that women and 
men had equal rights and prohibited the denial or abridgment of those 
rights on grounds of sex.10 The ERA was consistently and regularly 
introduced to Congress, but it took almost 50 years for both houses of 
Congress to adopt it by a two-thirds majority as required by Article V. 
Although 35 states ratified the ERA from 1972 to 1977, the effort to 
constitutionalize sex equality in the United States failed because of 
divisions within American legal feminism.11 In 1923, when the ERA was 
introduced, the women who had fought together for women’s suffrage 
could not unify behind the ERA. Florence Kelley, for instance, fought for 
woman’s suffrage while tirelessly and successfully advocating for labor 
laws that protected women and children.12 She headed the National 
Consumer League, for which Louis Brandeis authored the famous 
Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon.13 That brief, which largely shaped the 
Supreme Court’s decision to uphold maximum hours legislation for 
working women, relied on sociological data about the detrimental effects 
of factory work on mothers.14 In the 1920s, social feminists like Florence 
Kelley supported laws that afforded special protections to mothers. They 
believed that special protection for mothers would pave the way to higher 
levels of labor and health protection for all. By contrast, ERA advocates 
like Alice Paul viewed special protections for women as anathema to their 
constitutional vision of sex equality.15 In 1923, the Supreme Court 
embraced the ERA feminists’ skepticism of sex distinctions in the law, 
10. See AMELIA R. FRY, CONVERSATIONS WITH ALICE PAUL: WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 412 (1976). 
11. For an excellent recent account of the divisions among American women, particularly 
regarding the relationship between women’s rights and family values, see SPRUILL, supra note 3, at 
12. 
12. See NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF 12 (2015). 
13. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
14. Id. 
15. See FRY, supra note 10. 
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citing the newly ratified Nineteenth Amendment. The Court invalidated 
legislation enacting a mandatory minimum wage for women in Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital.16 Citing Lochner v. New York, the Court determined 
that the Nineteenth Amendment required a retreat from its 1908 reasoning 
in Muller, which had upheld protective labor legislation for women: 
In view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have 
taken place since [Muller] . . . , in the contractual, political, and civil 
status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not 
unreasonable to say that these differences have now come almost, if not 
quite, to the vanishing point.17 
The Court overruled Adkins in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 
upholding a statutory minimum wage for women based on Muller’s 
observation that “some legislation to protect [woman] seems necessary to 
secure a real equality of right.”18 However, a larger battle between “equal 
rights” feminism and social feminism continued. Alice Paul had been an 
adviser to the employer in the Adkins case,19 and it was in the same year 
that Adkins was decided that the ERA she had drafted was introduced in 
Congress. Social feminists like Florence Kelley did not support the ERA 
and Eleanor Roosevelt, who championed human rights and the 
advancement of women, did not support the ERA, largely due to the 
framing of constitutional sex equality as incompatible with the protection 
of mothers. 
This conflict took on new political dimensions when the ERA came 
closest to becoming law. Fifty years later, when Congress sent the ERA 
to the states for ratification, opposition to the ERA again focused on 
motherhood and whether constitutional sex equality would worsen the 
status of mothers. This opposition was led by Phyllis Schlafly, one of the 
most charismatic leaders of the conservative movement of the twentieth 
century, on the opposite end of the political spectrum from Florence 
Kelley. Kelley, after all, was strongly influenced by her encounters with 
the German social democratic party during her time studying abroad in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.20 Yet both Florence Kelley 
in the 1920s and Phyllis Schlafly in the 1970s opposed constitutional sex 
equality as framed by ERA proponents, from the standpoint of 
motherhood’s special status.21 That convergence is quite remarkable. It is 
16. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923). 
17. Id. at 553.
18. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 395 (1937). 
19. WOLOCH, supra note 12, at 128. 
20. KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK 95 (1995). 
21. Id. 
2017] THE CONSTITUTION OF MOTHERS 27 
a reminder that, in order to succeed, the constitutional advancement of 
women’s equality must address and engage motherhood and the problem 
of social reproduction across political divides. 
Today’s ERA proponents, such as Congresswoman Carolyn 
Maloney, its lead sponsor, focus on the issues like the persistence of 
unequal pay and the lack of strict scrutiny for sex-based distinctions in the 
law under the Equal Protection Clause.22 Other ERA advocates, such as 
the ERA Coalition, mention the persistence of pregnancy discrimination 
and the problems of work-family balance for women.23 Consider the 
public discourse, including the words of a Nevada legislator in March 
2017, as reported in a New York Times editorial following the Nevada 
ratification vote: 
“This bill is about equality, period,” said [Nevada] State Senator Pat 
Spearman, pointing to a raft of well-documented studies of continuing 
inequality. For example, the gap in earnings between women and men 
will not close until the year 2058, according to the Institute for Women’s 
Policy Research. The percentage of impoverished women has increased 
in recent years, while only 5.8 percent of chief executives on the list of 
the Fortune 500 companies are women. Women account for just 19.4 
percent of congressional seats now; it might take another century to raise 
that to 50 percent. The United States is ranked 45th in the 2016 Global 
Gender Gap of nations, below European nations, Belarus and Namibia, 
among others.24 
However, many scholarly commentators argue that we already have 
a de facto ERA because of the ways in which the failed amendment 
affected the subsequent development of equal protection, Title VII, and 
Title IX.25 When the ERA was not ratified by enough states by the 1982 
deadline, the amendment began to move out of the legal feminist 
22. Carolyn B. Maloney, Equal Rights Amendment, https://maloney.house.gov/issues/
womens-issues/equal-rights-amendment (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
23. JESSICA NEUWIRTH, EQUAL MEANS EQUAL: WHY THE TIME FOR AN EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENT IS NOW (2015).  
24. See Editorial Board, Pumping Life into the Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2017, at SR8. 
25. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, The Supreme Court Has Delivered on Many of the E.R.A.’s 
Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/08/was-
the-eras-defeat-really-a-loss-for-feminism/the-supreme-court-has-delivered-on-many-of-the-eras-
promises; David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1476 (2001); Michael Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002). Reva 
Siegel notes that the gender equality jurisprudence of equal protection, the so-called “de facto ERA,” 
was shaped by both the goals of ERA proponents and by the countermovement that prevented the 
ERA’s ratification.  Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).  
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landscape. The passionate advocates of gender equality turned their 
attention to existing constitutional guarantees of equality, mainly the 
Equal Protection Clause, as well as statutory prohibitions of sex 
discrimination. To some degree, these alternative strategies were 
successful. The Supreme Court began to scrutinize and invalidate sex 
distinctions in the law by way of the Equal Protection Clause.26 Twenty 
years ago, in United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
state’s maintenance of an all-male military academy as sex discrimination 
in violation of equal protection.27 Civil rights laws governing pay,28 terms 
and conditions of work,29 and educational opportunities30 were adopted in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, they have been interpreted as remedying 
many different forms of discrimination against women, and this has vastly 
widened women’s access to educational and employment opportunities 
previously unavailable to them. Because of the ways in which the Equal 
Protection Clause evolved to include gender equality by judicial 
interpretation and because statutes did what the ERA advocates aimed to 
achieve through constitutional amendment, it is now sometimes said that 
a constitutional guarantee of sex equality would add nothing of legal 
significance and would be merely symbolic. Implicit in the 
characterization of ERA as merely symbolic is the sense that the 
monumental political effort required to achieve an Article V amendment 
would not be worth the prize. 
However, the ERA, if adopted today in 2017, can be much more than 
a symbolic ratification of the progress made on legal sex equality to date. 
To contemplate a concrete and vivid picture of this potential, I believe that 
we as Americans can honor our Constitution on its birthday by engaging 
the best ideas produced by our constitutional peers. Constitution Day 
commemorates the day in 1787 that 39 men⸻ our “founding fathers”⸻ 
signed our nation’s sacred foundational document 230 years ago. Since 
then, constitutionalism, pioneered by the United States and stemming 
from the Enlightenment, spread around the world and evolved to spawn 
26. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating Idaho statute which preferred,
among equally qualified administrators of an estate, males over females); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating federal statute that imposed greater burdens on female members of 
uniformed services proving dependent status of husbands than on male members proving dependent 
status of wives); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating a provision of the 
Social Security Act that awarded “mother’s insurance benefits” only to widows, but not to widowers, 
upon death of working parent).  
27. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
28. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1996). 
29. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991). 
30. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986). 
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more modern constitutions, which, by the twentieth century, were adopted 
by founding mothers as well as founding fathers. After global movements 
for women’s suffrage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the twentieth century constitutions that emerged in Europe after World 
War I and World War II included women in the constituent assemblies.31 
Women contributed to the adoption of sex equality provisions similar to 
the ERA that we never got. Today, most constitutions around the world 
do explicitly guarantee women’s equal rights;32 many also include clauses 
extending special protections to mothers.33 
Engaging global constitutionalism can shed light on why and how 
women constitution-makers envisioned the meaning of gender equality in 
twentieth and twenty-first century constitutions. Leading European 
constitutions include provisions guaranteeing special rights or protections 
based on motherhood. These motherhood provisions were introduced and 
defended by women constitution-makers, who believed that protecting 
motherhood was a way of reducing women’s barriers to progress towards 
greater gender equality. Engaging these other constitutional traditions can 
help Americans imagine a different possible relationship between 
constitutional equality and motherhood protection: one of synthesis rather 
than conflict. Broadening our imagination by way of concrete examples 
of alternative paths is important because gender inequality still persists in 
the twenty-first century by way of women’s economic disadvantage and 
political underrepresentation, despite the interventions of American sex 
discrimination law in constitutional Equal Protection jurisprudence and 
civil rights statutes. 
The wage gap between men and women is significant; in the U.S., a 
woman makes 80 cents to the man’s dollar.34 Moreover, gender parity has 
not been achieved in representation or by participation in institutions that 
exercise economic and political power, whether it’s Congress,35 corporate 
31. See UTE FREVERT, WOMEN IN GERMAN HISTORY: FROM BOURGEOIS EMANCIPATION TO
SEXUAL LIBERATION 169 (1989); MOLLY TAMBOR, THE LOST WAVE: WOMEN AND DEMOCRACY IN 
POSTWAR ITALY 79 (2014); Assemblée Nationale, Les 33 Femmes élues Députées Pour la Première 
fois en 1945, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/evenements/2015/les-femmes-deputees-depuis-
1945#node_14429 (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
32. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More
than Ever, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 569, 578-79 (2014). 
33. See Suk, Global Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 401-02 (table showing European
countries with clauses on sex equality, substantive sex equality, and motherhood protection). 
34. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Chart 1, Women’s Earnings, Women’s Earnings as a
Percentage of Men’s, for Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers, 1979-2016 Annual Averages, at 2 
(August 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/2016/pdf/home.pdf. 
35. Women currently make up 19.4% of the House of Representatives and 21% of the Senate. 
See, Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics, Women in the U.S. Congress 2017 
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boards,36 or positions of responsibility in the workplace.37 In the United 
States, some economists have studied the wage gap and have suggested 
that the gender gap is really a motherhood gap.38 Mothers have lower 
wages than fathers who work, but women without children do about as 
well as men (with or without children). Prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of sex is inadequate to address the disadvantaging effects that 
raising children has on women. Sometimes, the enforcement of formal 
gender equality (that is, no use of sex categories in or by the law), can 
worsen, rather than alleviate, some of these burdens.39 
Even though the Equal Protection Clause has now been read to 
prohibit sex discrimination in most instances, and statutes prohibit sex 
discrimination in employment and education, American women continue 
to experience political and economic disadvantages that stem from their 
social role in raising the next generation of Americans. Is this a 
constitutional problem? In 1920, the U.S. was not the only country that 
constitutionalized women’s right to vote. In Germany, the Constitution of 
1919 was adopted right after women got the right to vote, and women 
were elected to the constituent assembly that adopted that constitution. 
That constitution included, for the first time, a clause guaranteeing the 
equal rights and responsibilities of men and women, as well as a clause 
entitling motherhood to the special protection of the state. Both clauses 
survived and were adopted in the German Basic Law that was adopted 
after World War II and is currently in force. Article 3.2 of the German 
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2017 (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
36. On the boards of Fortune 500 companies, women hold 20.2% of board seats. Deloitte, 
Missing Pieces Report: The 2016 Board Diversity Census of Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 
Boards, 10, http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2016-catalyst-census-women-and-men-board-
directors (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).  
37. Women hold 52% of all professional-level jobs, but only 14.6% of executive officer
positions, 8.1% of top earners, and 4.6% of Fortune 500 CEOs. Center for American Progress, Fact 
Sheet: The Women’s Leadership Gap, 1, https://www.scribd.com/document/211083206/Fact-Sheet-
The-Women-s-Leadership-Gap (last visited Oct 19, 2017). 
38. Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap 
for Young Professionals in the Corporate and Financial Sectors, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 12 (January 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14681.pdf. See also, 
Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap and Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender 
Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
(Jan. 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf. 
39. For an account of the dynamics by which the American commitment to gender-neutral 
family and medical leave can undermine efforts to address the needs of working mothers, see Julie C. 
Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010). A recent study by 
economists shows that gender-neutral family leave policies at universities have benefited men and 
have substantially reduced female tenure rates. See Heather Antecol, Kelly Bedard, & Jenna Stearns, 
Equal but Inequitable: Who Benefits from Gender-Neutral Tenure Clock Stopping Policies? 
INSTITUTE OF LABOR ECONOMICS (April 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9904.pdf. 
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Constitution provides: “Men and women shall have equal rights.”40 In 
1994, a sentence was added to elaborate, “The state shall promote the 
actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps 
to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.”41 Article 6.4 of the German 
Constitution provides: “Every mother shall be entitled to the protection 
and care of the community.”42 The equality and motherhood clauses, first 
introduced in 1919 in Germany, provided a template for many European 
constitutions of the twentieth century. The equal rights of women and 
men, and the motherhood protection clause, can also be found in the 
Preamble of the French Constitution of 194643 and the Italian Constitution 
of 1948.44 
These provisions did not begin as enforceable individual rights. 
These provisions were mechanisms to support political and social 
institutions as they adapted to the social and economic transformations 
that the World Wars accelerated. In the industrial economy, marriage, the 
family, and especially the caregiving role of mothers, constituted the 
infrastructure for the social reproduction of the nation. Women performed 
unpaid work in the home to raise the next generation of citizens and 
workers. Breadwinning male citizens performed market work and 
supported women and children. The economic and political order 
reproduced itself across generations by way of this division of roles. And, 
indeed, past exclusions of women from suffrage and from participation in 
political organizations enabled the continued operation of this particular 
infrastructure for raising the next generation. In Germany, regional laws 
prohibited women from attending meetings of political organizations from 
1850 to 1908 and excluded them from economic life.45 Similarly, in the 
United States, women were excluded from many professions, including 
the practice of law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this exclusion as consistent with the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause in the 1872 case of Bradwell v. State.46 
These exclusions were not intended solely to denigrate women; they 
constituted the silent constitutional enforcement of a particular 
40. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], art. 3(2), (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/. 
41. Id.
42. Id. at art. 6(4). 
43. 1958 CONST. Preamble of 1946 ¶ 11 (Fr.).
44. Art. 37 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
45. See KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, ANJA SCULER, & SUSAN STRASSER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 
FEMINISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, A DIALOGUE IN DOCUMENTS 1885-1933, at 33 
(1998). 
46. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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infrastructure for social reproduction known as the “separate spheres” 
tradition—men engaged in wage work and voted, providing economic 
support and political representation on behalf of their wives who stayed 
home and raised the children. In Germany, after women got the vote, 
women constitution-makers secured a provision explicitly stating that “in 
principle, men and women have the same rights and obligations.”47 In 
addition, they argued for other protections, including those for marriage, 
family, motherhood, and children born out of wedlock.48 These provisions 
were efforts to sustain the existing infrastructure of social reproduction in 
light of the realities of women’s new contributions to economic life. 
Mothers still played the central and leading role in raising children, and 
the women constitution-makers wanted the constitution to explicitly 
acknowledge it. Protecting motherhood would allow women to raise their 
children even while working and performing the socially valuable, 
previously male tasks that they had begun to take on during wartime.49 
Women participated in market work during World War I. Provisions such 
as equal rights for women and men, women’s suffrage, spousal equality 
in marriage attempted to make the old infrastructure of social reproduction 
an equal one, one which was compatible with women’s entry into the 
public sphere. Hence, also, the Weimar Constitution also prohibited 
discrimination against women in the civil service50 and the Italian 
constitution of 1948 guaranteed women equal pay for equal work. 
Article 37 of the Italian constitution provides: “The woman worker 
has the same rights, and for equal work, and the same compensation, paid 
to male workers. The conditions of work must permit the fulfillment of 
her essential functions in the family and assures to the mother and to the 
child a special and adequate protection.”51  In the United States, by 
contrast, the Supreme Court has suggested that treating mothers better 
than fathers for purposes of parental leave is contrary to equal 
protection.52 In defending the commitment to gender neutrality in parental 
leave, Justice Ginsburg did not necessarily embrace formal sex equality 
as such, but rather raised concerns about the unintended consequences of 
protecting maternity.53 If pregnant women get special accommodations or 
47. Weimar Constitution, Aug. 11, 1919, art. 109 (Ger.).
48. Id. at art. 119 and 121. 
49. See RENATE PORE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST: WOMEN IN GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY,
1919-1933 (1981); RICHARD EVANS, THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN GERMANY, 1894-1933 (1976). 
50. Weimar Constitution, supra note 47, at art. 128. 
51. Art. 37 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
52. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 754 (2003). 
53. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30, 45 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s justifications for the gender-neutral approach to 
2017] THE CONSTITUTION OF MOTHERS 33 
paid maternity leave, whereas injured men and fathers do not, employers 
will have incentives to avoid hiring or including pregnant workers.54 
Equal Protection Section V doctrine now says that protecting motherhood, 
for instance, by affording generous maternity leaves without equivalent 
paternity leaves, amounts to gender stereotyping55 that is ultimately 
detrimental to working women. From this constitutional mindset, it seems 
deeply paradoxical for so many European constitutions to guarantee sex 
equality and the special protection of mothers simultaneously. 
At the same time, European constitutional orders, especially the 
German Constitutional Court over the last quarter century, have flagged 
the danger of disadvantaging working women in efforts to protect 
maternity. In the Nocturnal Employment judgment in 1992, the German 
Constitutional Court invalidated a statute prohibiting women’s nighttime 
work.56 The Court recognized that those seeking to justify the statute were 
concerned about the burdens of nighttime work for women engaged in 
child-rearing and housework during the day. At the same time, the Court 
noted that banning women’s nighttime work would adversely affect 
women’s employment opportunities and could reinforce women’s role in 
child-rearing and housework.57 
Nonetheless, the German Constitutional Court has not invalidated all 
restrictions on mothers’ work and, in fact, has indicated that some of these 
restrictions may be constitutionally required. In Germany, as in most other 
European countries, the maternity leave statute (“Muttershutzgesetz”) 
makes some portion of maternity leave compulsory for every new mother. 
In Germany, women may not return to work until eight weeks after the 
birth of the baby.58 In 2006, the Constitutional Court held that the time 
spent on maternity leave should be counted as time worked for 
unemployment insurance purposes. In reaching this decision, the Court 
determined that mandatory maternity leave was constitutionally required 
medical leave that encompasses pregnancy leave, see Julie C. Suk, “A More Egalitarian Relationship 
at Home and at Work”: Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 473 (2013). 
54. Coleman, 566 U.S. at 50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
55. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by 
parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.”) 
56. BVerfGE [Nocturnal Employment Decision], 1 BvR 1025/84, January 28, 1992,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/1992/01/rs19920128_1b
vr102584.html. (Trans. Donald Kommers, German Law Archive), http://www.iuscomp.org/
wordpress/?p=79. 
57. Id. 
58. Gesetz zum Schutze der erwerbstätigen Mutter [Mutterschutzgesetz - MuSchG] [Maternity 
Protection Act], Jan. 24, 1952, BGBL. I.S. at 69, (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/muschg/MuSchG.pdf.  
34 CONLAWNOW [9:23 
under Article 6.4’s provision protecting motherhood.59 Taking the 
requirements of motherhood protection along with Article 3(2)’s 
guarantee of equal rights for women and men, and the state’s duty to 
implement equal rights and eliminate existing disadvantages, the Court 
concluded that the constitution required the state to compensate the 
disadvantages attributable to taking maternity leave.60 
Courts and legal actors in various settings have struggled with 
whether legal equality should mean sameness of treatment (with few 
exceptions), or whether it authorizes and sometimes requires different 
treatment, especially concerning mothers’ distinctive role in biological 
and social reproduction. Assisted reproductive technologies are changing 
the boundaries of biological motherhood, as it is now possible for the 
genetic mother to be different from the gestating mother, while 
transformations in the economy and cultural norms over the last century 
have changed the boundaries of social motherhood. Mothers today are not 
always primary caregivers. Sometimes they are breadwinners, and the 
fathers act as primary caregivers. Same-sex couples also form families 
and allocate breadwinning and caregiving in a variety of ways. In an 
increasing number of households, each parent holds a full-time job 
making it difficult for any parent to fulfill the same primary caregiver 
functions that mothers performed when they were excluded from the 
public sphere.61 
In the United States, there is a fear that protecting motherhood will 
ultimately undermine women’s struggle for equal status. Conflicts 
growing out of this fear have shaped the horizons of women’s 
constitutional equality for a hundred years. But it does not have to be that 
way. Recently, the courts in many European jurisdictions have read 
motherhood protection together with equality clauses to protect and 
enforce a gender-equal infrastructure for the raising of children.62 In 
Europe, twentieth century constitutions’ protections of motherhood 
normalized the profoundly important expectation that the state become 
positively obligated to support pregnant women and the raising of 
children. 
In recent years, the German legislature has attempted to implement 
the 1994 constitutional gender equality amendment that says, “The state 
59. See BVerfG, supra note 56, at 1 BvL 10/01. 
60. Id. 
61. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES SUMMARY 
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.nr0.htm. 
62. For a more extensive account of this jurisprudence and its interpretation as an infrastructure 
of social reproduction, see Julie C. Suk, Global Constitutionalism, supra note 9, at 426-29). 
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shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and 
men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.”63 One set 
of reforms introduces various policies designed to encourage fathers to 
partake in more caregiving, on the theory that the burdens of caregiving 
often fall on mothers resulting in disadvantages in the workplace. For 
instance, in Germany as of 2006, the amount of money available for any 
family childcare benefit is keyed to the salary of the parent taking the 
leave.64 Because fathers typically have higher wages than mothers, this is 
clearly a nudge to fathers. The Federal Constitutional Court has upheld 
these initiatives as valid enforcements of the gender equality clause.65 One 
way of understanding these developments is to look at how the 
constitutional protection of motherhood is now being expanded through 
the law of gender equality towards the constitutional protection of 
parenthood. However, unlike the American framework of gender-
neutrality as the paradigm of constitutional sex equality, starting with 
motherhood protection leads to a different result. In the United States, 
gender equality without motherhood protection has meant treating 
mothers as ungenerously as one treats fathers. In Europe, by contrast, 
motherhood protections meant making sure that working mothers could 
work and raise children at the same time. Now, a more robust commitment 
to gender equality means making that same work-family balance available 
to both sexes, in recognizing that women and men both participate equally 
in market work and child-rearing. Thus, a new infrastructure of social 
reproduction can evolve to replace the one that relies on mothers’ 
exclusion or minimal involvement in the public sphere. 
On Constitution Day, we should reflect not only on the 39 men who 
signed our sacred document, but also on what all constitution-makers 
aspire to accomplish. A constitution, by its very nature, outlasts its 
founders and drafters; it is concerned, explicitly or implicitly, with 
building a stable political order that continues beyond the lives of its 
founders. The polity endures by reproducing itself biologically and 
socially. Our founding fathers did not make social reproduction an explicit 
topic of constitutional concern but judges in the nineteenth century did by 
upholding the exclusion of women from certain professions. The 
63. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law], art. 3(2), (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-
iminternet.de/englisch_gg/. 
64. Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit [Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz –
BEEG] [Partental Allowance and Parental Leave Act], Dec. 5, 2006, BGBL I, at 2748, art. 1 (Ger.) 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Methoden/Rechtsgrundlagen/Statistikbereiche/Inhalte/570_GElterngeld
Elternzeit.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
65. See BVerfG, supra note 56, at1 BvR 2712/09. 
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exclusion of women from constitutional rights was an essential 
component of the social reproduction infrastructure for the American 
nation. Women could do the necessary work of running the home and 
raising children to ensure the nation’s continuation because they were not 
preoccupied with market work or political participation. 
Today, constitutional gender equality must be understood not only 
as women’s rights, or the rights of men and women to be liberated from 
gender roles, but rather, as the new twenty-first century infrastructure of 
social reproduction. The twenty-first century economy depends on men 
and women participating in market work, and this in turn requires our 
social and political institutions to support the raising of children. This 
vision of gender equality, which was facilitated by the early twentieth 
century protection of motherhood in post-war European constitutions, is 
one that is taking hold in many other constitutional orders outside the 
United States. I hope that reflecting on these ideas will reinvigorate our 
commitment to realizing the ideals of equality and democracy that enabled 
the first Constitution Day in 1787. 
